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I. Introduction
 In February 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear a case that challenged 
the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Texas 
at Austin (“the university”). In addition to the evidence put forward by the parties, 
a broad constituency of individuals and organizations on both sides of the debate 
mobilized to inform the Court of the arguments under consideration. For example, 
amici curiae in support of the university presented research to impress upon the 
Court the need for postsecondary institutions to be permitted to consider race as 
one among myriad factors in admissions to fulfill their educational missions. Amici 
in support of Fisher also submitted a wide range of sources to support arguments 
that the university’s race-conscious policy did not meet the requirements of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Four years later in 2016, the Court ultimately upheld 
the constitutionality of the policy in a 4-3 decision.1 Applying the standard of 
strict scrutiny, the Court’s decision re-affirmed decades of precedent establishing 
that postsecondary institutions had a compelling interest in furthering a diverse 
student body and held that, as implemented by the university, the use of race 
was narrowly tailored to this goal. Justice Kennedy, who for the first time found a 
race-conscious policy in education to be narrowly tailored, authored the majority 
opinion in the case.2 
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of Houston. They are each higher education scholars who examine the intersections of policy and 
the law. Liliana M. Garces served as counsel of record in an amicus curiae brief filed by 444 social 
scientists in Support of Respondent in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013) and an amicus 
brief filed by 823 social scientists in Support of Respondent in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
(2016). The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the W.T. Grant Foundation. The findings 
represent the perspectives of the authors alone. We thank Michelle Allmendinger, Cameron Tanner, 
and Graham Hunter for their assistance with this Article. 
1 Justice Kagan recused herself in light of her past involvement in the case endorsing the 
university’s race-conscious admissions policy, and Justice Scalia had passed away, so only seven 
Justices voted in the case. Overall, the Court issued two separate opinions in the case. The 2016 
decision followed a 2013 ruling remanding the case to the lower court, (Fisher v. University of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I]), a second ruling from the lower court upholding 
(yet again) the constitutionality of the policy (Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 758 F. 3d 633 (5th Cir. 
2014)) and an extremely rare decision by the Court to agree to hear the case for a second time (Fisher 
v. University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]). 
2 In two past cases, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003), and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 706 (2007), Justice Kennedy found the 
consideration of race in a postsecondary admissions policy, and a voluntary student assignment 
desegregation policy, respectively, not to be narrowly tailored.
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 Across various concurring and dissenting opinions, it was apparent that the 
Justices viewed and treated in conflicting ways the non-legal sources3 submitted to 
inform their ruling in the case. To help inform future research and litigation efforts, 
this Article explores how the Justices used4 such non-legal sources and amicus curiae 
briefs in their opinions in Fisher I and Fisher II and the implications for colleges and 
universities broadly, the social science research community specifically, and amici, 
going forward. This examination is important because the Court’s decisions provide 
the contours around which colleges and universities must operate. Understanding 
how non-legal sources and amicus curiae briefs were cited and interpreted within 
this framework will illuminate the ways in which these sources can be relevant for 
educational policies and practices and continuing legal developments.5 
 In Part II, to set the context for this Article and situate the analysis within existing 
scholarship, we summarize research on the Court’s use of social science evidence 
as well as the Court’s use of amicus briefs. In Part III, to provide background for the 
cases on which we focus, we briefly summarize Fisher I and Fisher II. In Part IV, we 
examine how the Justices used non-legal sources and amicus briefs in their opinions 
to address the constitutional question in the case. Overall, the Justices cited a range 
of non-legal sources and amicus briefs to support various factual, legal, or contextual 
determinations in their opinions. The non-legal sources included items such as news 
articles (media), journal articles in the areas of education and law, and books. Our 
analysis reveals that across the various opinions, the ways the Justices conceptualized 
(1) the manifestation of race (i.e., as skin color alone or as socially constructed in a number 
of ways) and (2) classifications on the basis of race (i.e., as whether the classification 
itself involves racial discrimination or not) informed their use of non-legal sources 
and amicus briefs and the extent to which they were relevant to the Justices’ various 
factual, legal, or contextual determinations. In Part V, we discuss the implications for 
colleges and universities of the Court’s use of non-legal sources, including social 
science evidence, and amicus briefs in their ruling. We present the lines of research 
that may be important for scholars to pursue as judges and colleges and universities 
continue to debate the role race should play in postsecondary policies and practices.
3 We employ the term non-legal sources to include the range of sources that the Justices cited 
in their opinions and that fall outside the traditional “legal” sources such as legal cases, statutes, 
or regulations. These sources, which include, in part, demographic data, news sources, books, law 
journal articles, and education articles, may have come to the attention of the Justices via the parties, 
amicus briefs, or their own searches. For a complete list of categories of non-legal sources cited in 
Fisher I and Fisher II, see Patricia Marin, Catherine L. Horn, Karen Miksch, Liliana M. Garces & John 
T. Yun, Use of Extra-Legal Sources in Amicus Curiae Briefs Submitted in Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin, 24 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives (forthcoming 2018) (setting forth 20 types of non-legal 
sources cited in all amicus briefs filed in Fisher I and II and analyzing relative use of each type of 
source by supporting party and category of amici). 
4 We define “use” as both explicit citations to such sources as well as instances in which the 
Justices’ conclusions reflect the conclusions or findings of social science research.
5 Two new challenges to the constitutionality of race-conscious policies at Harvard 
University and UNC-Chapel Hill, for example, are making their way through the lower courts 
and may ultimately reach the Supreme Court. See Brittany N. Ellis, The Harvard Admissions Lawsuit 
Explained, The Harvard Crimson, Nov. 7, 2016, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/11/7/
harvard-admissions-lawsuit-explainer/; UNC’s affirmative action lawsuit moves forward with Supreme 
Court ruling, The Daily Tarheel, Nov. 20, 2016, http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2016/11/uncs-
affirmative-action-lawsuit-moves-forward-with-supreme-court-ruling.  
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II. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Non-Legal Sources and  
Amicus Curiae Briefs
Research has examined the Justices’ use of social science, amicus curiae briefs,6 
and other non-legal sources that have been presented to the Court in support of 
one side or the other of a case.7 To be sure, the extent to which non-legal sources 
such as social science research should inform judicial decision making on questions 
of constitutional significance remains a disputed normative question.8 After all, 
social science research is not free of subjectivity and can call into question prior 
accepted findings depending on the advancement of research methods. Indeed, 
some conflicting findings reflect the normal development of science, which depends 
on the accumulation of knowledge gathered over time, and across multiple contexts, 
by many different scholars. For these reasons, while social science research has 
informed constitutional questions,9 disputes often arise over whether such evidence 
is consistent enough to be a reliable basis for legal action. For the purposes of 
this Article, what is most compelling is that non-legal sources and amicus briefs 
continue to be submitted to the Court and the Court continues to incorporate some 
of these sources into their opinions, thereby motivating our analysis.
Social science research has played an increasing role in the legal advocacy before 
the U.S. Supreme Court as well as in its judicial opinions most notably since the 
1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision.10 Although not the first use of modern 
social science, Brown’s footnote 11 citing seven psychological and sociological 
studies is considered a turning point for the Court’s consideration, and inclusion 
of, empirical evidence in its opinions.11 That increased use of social science by legal 
advocates and the Supreme Court has generated a body of research examining 
these phenomena. For example, historical studies have analyzed the evolution of 
the incorporation of more social science into the Court’s thinking and opinions.12 
Empirical analyses have investigated the frequency of social science citations by 
6 For this Article, we treat amicus briefs as a source of evidence that can be cited by the Court. 
In other work (see Marin et al., supra note 3) we further disentangle all the sources that can be cited 
within amicus briefs themselves.
7 As it is beyond the scope of the Article to discuss this entire body of scholarship, we focus 
on examples that are most relevant to this Article.
8 See Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science in Parents Involved 
and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 U. Louisville L. Rev. 703, 706 (2007); Liliana 
M. Garces, Social Science Research and the Courts: Informing Post-Grutter v. Bollinger Developments in 
Higher Education Cases, 27 Educ. Pol’y 591, 593 (2013).
9 See, e.g., Angelo N. Ancheta, Scientific Evidence and Equal Protection of the Law (2006) 
(discussing line of constitutional cases in which social science evidence has been deemed relevant).
10 See Catherine L. Horn & Patricia Marin, Higher education and affirmative action: 
Understanding and enhancing the use of policy research in informing decision-making (Nov. 2012); 
Garces, 2013, supra note 8 at 592; Ancheta, 2006, supra note 9; Rosemary J. Erickson & Rita J. Simon, 
The Use of Social Science Data in Supreme Court Decisions (1998).
11 See Ancheta, 2006, supra note 9; Erickson & Simon, supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., Thomas G. Hansford & Kristen Johnson, The Supply of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the 
Market for Information at the U. S. Supreme Court, 35 Just. Sys. J. 362 (2014).
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the Court,13 as well as differing citation patterns among the Justices and between 
majority and dissenting opinions.14 A related body of scholarly work characterizes 
the Justices’ use of social science as unpredictable. For example, some have 
focused on the instances in which the Court has ignored social science,15 others 
have described the misinterpretation of research by the Court,16 and yet others 
have discussed the misuse of social science by the Court.17 Overall, a review of 
existing scholarship reveals that such evidence has been presented to the courts 
and cited in decisions, ultimately informing the jurisprudence in various cases.18 
Most recently in the context of postsecondary education in Grutter v. Bollinger19 
and Gratz v. Bollinger,20 the Court again demonstrated that scientific evidence 
and expert testimony can play important roles in constitutional analysis. Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter cited multiple research studies that 
addressed the educational benefits of racial and ethnic diversity to support the 
Court’s conclusion that institutions of higher education have a compelling interest 
in the educational benefits of a diverse student body.21 Various research studies 
were also relevant to the Court’s narrow tailoring analysis.22 By referencing such 
studies, the Court acknowledged that legal determinations can be supported by 
non-legal sources that speak to the relationship between fact and law. 
In addition, much of the social science (and other non-legal sources) put 
before the Court is done so via amicus curiae briefs, the submission of which has 
increased markedly over time.23 Work seeking to understand the impact of these 
briefs, however, has shown mixed results.24 Similarly, studies have varied in their 
13 See, e.g., James R. Acker, Thirty Years of Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases, 12 Law 
& Pol’y 1 (1990).
14 See James R. Acker, Research on the Death Penalty. A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, 
Empirical Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 Law & Soc’y Rev. 65 (1993).
15 See, e.g., Craig Haney & Deana Dorman Logan, Broken Promise: The Supreme Court’s Response 
to Social Science Research on Capital Punishment, 50 J. Soc. Issues 75 (1994).
16 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 
Am. J. L. & Med. 335 (1987).
17 Donald Bersoff & David Glass, The Not-So Weisman: The Supreme Court’s Continuing Misuse 
of Social Science Research, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 279 (1995).
18 See, e.g., Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 8.
19 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
20 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003). 
21 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citing relevant studies).
22 See, e.g., Catherine L. Horn & Stella M. Flores, Percent Plans in College Admissions: A 
Comparative Analysis of Three States’ Experiences, The Civil Rights Project (2003), available at http://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/affirmativeaction/tristate.pdf; Patricia Marin & Edgar K. 
Lee, Appearance and Reality in the Sunshine State: The Talented 20 Program in Florida, The Civil Rights 
Project (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ research/affirmativeaction/
florida.pdf.
23 See Reagan W. Simpson & Mary R. Vasaly, The Amicus Brief: Answering the Ten Most 
Important Questions About Amicus Practice (4th ed. 2015).
24 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who 
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findings with respect to the conditions that produce strategically useful products.25 
Regardless of the impact or of the “doubts about the utility of conducting research 
to influence the judicial policy-making process”,26 the increased use of amicus briefs 
suggests that amici are convinced of their value27 due to “their perceived impact on 
the Court’s decisions.”28
III. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Decisions in  
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
A. Fisher I
When the Supreme Court heard Fisher in 2012, many in the higher education 
community were concerned that the Court would reverse, or severely limit, prior 
rulings upholding the constitutionality of race-conscious practices in postsecondary 
admissions.29 Given the composition in the Court, few observers expected the 
7-1 opinion in 2013 that sent the case back to the Fifth Circuit for further review, 
leaving in place the core principles that allowed for race-conscious policies.30 In 
its ruling, the Court clarified that the lower court had to conduct its independent 
determination of whether the race-conscious policy is necessary (i.e., narrowly 
tailored) for the university to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student 
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. Pol. 782 (1990); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Supreme 
Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making (2008); Paul M. Collins, Pamela C. Corley & 
Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U. S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, 49 Law 
& Soc’y Rev. 917 (2015); Allison O. Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1757 (2014); 
Claire B. Wofford, Assessing the Anecdotes: Amici Curiae, Legal Rules, and the U.S. Supreme Court, 36 
Just. Sys. J. 274 (2015).
25 See Julie Margetta Morgan & Diana Pullin, Challenges and Strategies for Bridging Gaps Between 
Law and Research, 39 Educ. Researcher 515 (2010); Katie Zuber, Udi Sommer & Jonathon Parent, 
Setting the Agenda of the United States Supreme Court? Organized Interests and the Decision to File an 
Amicus Curiae Brief at Cert, 36 Just. Sys. J. 119 (2015). 
26 See Charles Robert Tremper, Sanguinity and Disillusionment Where Law Meets Social Science, 11 
Law & Hum. Behav. 267, 270 (1987).
27 See Jonathon Alger & Marvin Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned From the 
University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503 (2004); Caldeira & Wright, 1990, supra note 24.
28 Simpson & Vasaly, supra note 23, at 11.
29 Concern over the future permissibility of race-conscious practices was warranted, due to the 
composition of the Court. Four Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia— 
had voted to strike down the use of race in admissions policies under any circumstances, and Justice 
Kennedy had dissented in Grutter, which upheld the constitutionality of race-conscious policies 
in postsecondary admissions on the grounds that the University of Michigan Law School’s policy 
was a disguised quota. Only three other current Justices—Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg—have 
supported race-conscious policies in education. Justice Kagan, who might have sided with the latter 
group, recused herself in light of her involvement in the case in the early stages of litigation. Thus, with 
Justice Kennedy as the swing vote, UT Austin’s policy could have been struck down as unconstitutional in 
a 5-3 vote or, with a 4-4 tie, left in place based on the lower court’s ruling that the policy is constitutional.
30 Other analyses have described the Court’s 2013 decision to remand the case to the lower 
court—rather than to overrule the lower court’s decision 5-3 or let it stand with a tie vote, as the 
composition of the Court suggested—as a compromise. See Mark Walsh, Fiery Draft Dissent by 
Sotomayor Influenced Race Case, New Book Says, Education Week, Oct. 10, 2014, http://blogs.edweek.
org/edweek/school_law/2014/10/fiery_draft_dissent_by_sotomay.html.
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body. The Court’s decision also clarified the importance of considering workable 
“race-neutral”31 alternatives, stating that if a non-racial approach could promote 
diversity “about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,”32 then the 
university could not consider race directly.33 
B. Fisher II
Following remand, and after reconsidering the case, the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that UT Austin’s admissions policy met the Court’s requirements, as clarified 
in its 2013 opinion. Fisher then appealed, arguing that the Fifth Circuit still had 
not applied the Court’s requirements in past cases correctly, and the Court, in a 
rare move, agreed to hear the case again. The constitutional question the Court 
addressed in Fisher II was: whether UT Austin’s race-conscious admissions policy 
met strict scrutiny requirements as interpreted in prior cases, including the 2013 
Fisher decision. Part of the determination concerned whether the university would 
be allowed to complement the percent plan with a race-conscious holistic review 
(an affirmance of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling) or whether the percent plan was 
deemed sufficient (disagreeing with the lower court).34
IV.  The Justices’ Use of Non-Legal Sources and Amicus curiae Briefs
 In this Part, we examine the Justices’ use of non-legal sources and amicus 
curiae briefs in their various opinions. For our analysis, we define “use” as both 
explicit citation as well as instances in which the Justices’ conclusions reflected the 
conclusions or findings of a non-legal source.35 In some instances, we highlight 
areas where the conclusions in the cited non-legal sources were refuted by other 
sources, primarily social science research. To be sure, even when the opinions do 
31 There is substantial debate as to whether policies can be deemed “race-neutral,” particularly 
when they have racial consequences or are based on racial considerations (see, e.g., Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, 
Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America (4th 
ed. 2014)). In the legal context, however, a policy is deemed “race-neutral” when it does not explicitly 
reference race, even if it indirectly considers race. This artificial legal definition led Justice Ginsburg 
to state in her dissent in Fisher I, “I have said before and reiterate here that only an ostrich could regard 
the supposedly neutral alternatives [i.e., the Top Ten Percent Plan] as race unconscious” (at 2433).
32 Fisher I, at 2420.
33 Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the determination that 
the lower court did not apply strict scrutiny, but disagreed with the need to send it back to the lower 
court. Rather than remanding the case to the lower court, he would categorically prohibit the consideration 
of race under the Equal Protection Clause. Only Justice Ginsburg dissented, on the grounds that the 
facts were sufficient to find the university’s use of race constitutional without a remand.
34 See Liliana M. Garces, Balancing Liberty and Equality: Justice Kennedy’s Decisive Vote in Fisher 
v. University of Texas, Part II, 44 Educ. Researcher 442, 443–44 (2015) for a longer explanation of the 
legal issues in the case. 
35 It is important to note that the latter is not based on a systematic, exhaustive analysis of the 
opinions and is intended simply to be illustrative of alignment between conclusions in a Justice’s 
opinion and findings from non-legal sources, particularly social science research. While we highlight 
most of the instances where the Justices cite non-legal sources, in some instances we limit our 
discussion to some examples that illustrate the major take-away. 
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not explicitly reference a non-legal source or an amicus brief, it is possible that, at 
some point in time, the Justice used or was informed by such a source or brief in 
his or her deliberation. It is also possible that a non-legal source or amicus brief that 
includes information similar to those already cited would not be cited to avoid 
duplication. Thus, the fact that a non-legal source is not explicitly cited does not 
mean that it was not used; there are many other types of influence that our analysis 
cannot capture. Accordingly, the following question guided our main analysis: If a 
Justice cited/used non-legal sources or an amicus brief in his or her opinion, what 
factual, legal, or contextual determination did it support? 
Overall, the Justices cited a range of non-legal sources and amicus briefs to support 
various factual, legal, or contextual determinations in their opinions. Our analysis 
reveals that across the various opinions, the way the Justices conceptualized (1) 
the manifestation of race (i.e., as skin color alone or as socially constructed in a 
number of ways) and (2) classifications on the basis of race (i.e., as whether the 
classification itself involves racial discrimination or not) informed their use of non-
legal sources and amicus briefs and the extent to which they were relevant to the 
Justices’ various factual, legal, or contextual determinations. On the first point, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, for example, illustrates an understanding of race that 
is contextual—that is, one that can operate alongside other factors and that can 
be relevant to the experiences of all students. Justice Alito’s opinion, on the other 
hand, reflects a definition of race that appears to be limited to skin color. With this 
lens, he cites to the same non-legal sources from the factual record that Kennedy 
relies on, but to reach the opposite conclusion that race is “omnipresen[t]” in 
the university’s admissions policy. These conflicting definitions of the ways race 
manifests informed their use of non-legal sources and amicus briefs. 
On the second factor underlying the Justice’s different uses of non-legal sources—
whether the racial classification itself involves racial discrimination—Justice 
Kennedy’s and Justice Ginsburg’s opinion reflect an understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause that allows for the consideration of race to address the ongoing 
significance of race and racial inequities. Under this reading, non-legal sources 
submitted in the factual record were sufficient to meet the various elements of 
narrow tailoring, and for Ginsburg in particular, to satisfy constitutional requirements 
even  before the Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. By contrast, Justice 
Thomas’ and Justice Alito’s opinions reflect an “anti classification” reading of the 
Equal Protection Clause; that is, one that equates racial classifications with racial 
discrimination. From this perspective, any non-legal sources that relate to the 
educational benefits of diversity are irrelevant. Because the classification itself 
is harmful, it cannot be tolerated under the principle of Equal Protection much less 
constitute a compelling interest.  Under this view, instead, the non-legal sources 
that are relevant instead are those that, like for Thomas, demonstrate the harms to 
student of color, such as those that are alleged under a mismatch theory, or like for 
Alito, non-legal sources that support arguments for why the university’s goals are a 
“pretext” for racial discrimination. These different understandings of the Equal 
Protection Clause by various Justices thus informed the ways they cited non-legal 
sources as well as amicus briefs. 
Below, we start with Kennedy’s majority opinions in Fisher I and Fisher II and 
then we discuss other Justices’ opinions in the order in which they appear in each 
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case. Proceeding in this way allows us to highlight the connection between each of 
the Justice’s conceptualization of race and racial classifications and his, or her, use 
of non-legal sources in the respective opinion.  
A. Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion in Fisher I36 and Fisher II37
 An important feature of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in both Fisher I 
and Fisher II are his references to evidence from the record—the 2004 Proposal, 
findings from the university’s survey of students, affidavits, and depositions—
and an amicus brief to support factual conclusions and legal determinations in the 
case. Throughout both opinions, Kennedy takes evidence from the record at face 
value; that is, he finds it sufficient to establish factual conclusions and to meet the 
elements of narrow tailoring in the case. As we discuss in a section below, this is 
an approach that is in stark contrast to how Justice Thomas in Fisher I and Justice 
Alito in Fisher II consider these same sources. 
1. Factual Conclusions
 In setting forth the factual conclusions in Fisher I and Fisher II, Kennedy 
cites to demographic data and other non-legal sources submitted in the record 
to conclude that the University’s race-conscious admission, combined with the 
Top Ten Percent Plan (TTP), resulted in a student body that was more racially 
diverse than the student body that was admitted under other admissions regimes 
(pre-Hopwood and pre-TTP, as well as post-Hopwood, pre-race-conscious policy). 
Kennedy also cites to the factual record to outline the steps that the University took 
before implementing its race-conscious policy. He cites to the University’s Proposal 
in 2014, which relied on findings from several sources, including a study that showed 
that few undergraduate classes containing between 5 and 24 students “had significant 
enrollment by members of racial minorities” and “reports from students regarding 
their ‘interaction in the classroom.’”38 Kennedy also cites to the record to summarize 
the various factors that go into a determination of admission, including essays and other 
factors that contribute to an applicant’s scores. Based on these factors, he concludes 
that race is ultimately considered in an “indirect” fashion; that is, it is “contextual”39 
and does not operate as a “mechanical factor.”40 He also notes that the consideration 
of race can be relevant for individuals from any racial group, including Whites and 
Asian Americans. In making this point, he cites to the Amicus Curiae Brief for Asian 
American Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. for the proposition that “the contention 
that the University discriminates against Asian-Americans is ‘entirely unsupported 
by evidence in the record or empirical data.’”41 This is an important reference that stands 
in stark contrast to the conclusions Thomas and Alito make in their respective opinions. 
36 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor.
37 Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg.
38 Fisher I, at 2416; Fisher II, passim.
39 Fisher II, at 2207.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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2. Legal Determinations on Narrow Tailoring
 In addition to establishing the factual conclusions, Kennedy cites to the non-
legal sources from the record to support various legal determinations related to 
the narrow tailoring elements in the case. These legal determinations include: 
(a) whether the university’s interests are concrete and precise; (b) whether the 
university offered a reasoned and principled explanation for its race-conscious 
policy; and (c) whether the consideration of race was necessary given the 
sufficiency of other race-neutral efforts or the impact of race-conscious admissions 
on the diversity of the student body. In addressing each of these points, Kennedy 
cites to the non-legal sources in the record to conclude that the university’s policy 
meets each of these requirements.  
 On the first element, he states: “The record reveals that in first setting forth its 
current admissions policy, the University articulated concrete and precise goals.”42 
Specifically, he states: “On the first page of its 2004 ‘Proposal to Consider Race 
and Ethnicity in Admissions,’ the University identifies the educational values it 
seeks to realize through its admissions process: the destruction of stereotypes, 
the promot[ion of] cross-racial understanding, the preparation of a student body 
for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and the cultivat[ion of] a set 
of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” [citing the supplemental 
appendix, depositions, and affidavits] [internal quotes omitted].”43 To conclude 
that the university has offered a “‘reasoned, principled explanation’ for its decision 
to pursue these goals,” Kennedy references “The University’s 39-page proposal” 
that “was written following a year-long study, which concluded that ‘[t]he use 
of race-neutral policies and programs ha[d] not been successful’ in ‘provid[ing] 
an educational setting that fosters cross-racial understanding, provid[ing] 
enlightened discussion and learning, [or] prepar[ing] students to function in an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society’” [citing the supplemental appendix 
and affidavits].44
 Finally, in concluding that the consideration of race was necessary, Kennedy 
cites to non-legal sources in the record that supported the university’s position. He 
states, the “University conducted “months of study and deliberation, including 
retreats, interviews, [and] review of data,” App. 446a, and concludes that “[t]he 
use of race-neutral policies and programs ha[d] not been successful in achieving” 
sufficient racial diversity at the University, Supp. App. 25a”.45 He notes, “The record 
itself contains significant evidence, both statistical and anecdotal, in support of the 
42 Id. at 2211.
43 Id.
44 Id. As we note below, Justice Alito dismisses the relevance of this evidence on the grounds 
that it is “self-serving” (Fisher II, at 2223).
45  Fisher II, at 2211. In considering the empirical evidence, Kennedy limits the bounds of 
the evidence to that which was available to UT at the time of Ms. Fisher’s application to UT. In 
doing so, he dismisses “extra-record” evidence Justice Alito relies on in his dissent, while bringing 
attention to the importance of ongoing studies that the University needs to undertake to defend its 
race-conscious policy from legal threat in the future (a point we address in more detail below).  
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University’s position.”46 The anecdotal evidence he refers to includes “evidence 
that minority students admitted under the Hopwood regime experienced feelings 
of loneliness and isolation. See, e.g., App. 317a–318a.”47 He states, “This anecdotal 
evidence is, in turn, bolstered by further, more nuanced quantitative data,”48 
which includes findings from the university’s report regarding the number of 
African American or Latino students in small undergraduate classes. Finally, 
Kennedy cites to evidence related to “the many ways in which [the University] 
already had intensified its outreach efforts to those students,” including the fact 
that the university “created three new scholarship programs, opened new regional 
admissions centers, increased its recruitment budget by half-a-million dollars, and 
organized over 1,000 recruitment events. Supp. App. 29a–32a; App. 450a–452a 
(citing affidavit of Michael Orr ¶¶ 4–20).”49 
3. Legal Determinations on Narrow Tailoring Reflecting Findings of Social Science Research
 Notably, the conclusions Kennedy draws about each of the elements of the 
narrow tailoring analysis often reflects the findings from social science research 
even though he does not always cite to specific sources. For example, in addressing 
petitioner’s argument that the university lacked a defined goal by not specifying 
a level of minority enrollment that would constitute a “critical mass,” Kennedy 
states: “Increasing minority enrollment may be instrumental to [the] educational 
benefits [of diversity], but it is not, as petitioner seems to suggest, a goal that can 
or should be reduced to pure numbers.”50 Instead, Kennedy draws attention to 
the importance of “provid[ing] an educational setting that fosters cross-racial 
understanding … [and] enlightened discussion and learning.”51 Both of these 
conclusions draw attention to the experiences of students, not only their numbers 
on colleges campuses, as an important component for attaining the educational 
benefits of diversity. This important connection reflects findings of research that 
was submitted to inform the Court’s deliberation in the case in a number of amicus 
briefs in support of the university.52  
46 Id. at 2212.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2213.
50 Id. at 2210.
51 Id. at 2211.
52 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al., Fisher 
v. University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), at *5 in support of Petitioner 
(citing to multiple studies finding that more numbers of students of color, coupled with institutional 
support and strategies for meaningful intergroup interaction, is effective in decreasing prejudice 
by encouraging both formal and informal intergroup contact and friendships, as well as increasing 
students’ cognitive abilities, critical thinking skills, and civic engagement); Brief of 823 Social 
Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), at *18 (citing to analyses of decades of research on diversity finding 
that numbers alone do not generate educational benefits; rather, the interactions that take place 
among students, the particular contexts of these interactions, and the conditions that help facilitate 
productive interactions generate the exchange of ideas that are necessary for realizing the educational 
benefits of diversity). 
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B. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion in Fisher I (joined by Justice Scalia)
 In his concurring opinion in Fisher I, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
cites a broad range of non-legal sources—books, law journal articles,53 education 
journal articles,54 policy reports,55  and news media56—to support the overall 
argument that the educational benefits that flow from diversity do not constitute 
a compelling interest. His use of non-legal sources throughout the opinion mostly 
provides contextual support for these legal determinations, all of which reflect a 
fundamental disagreement with Kennedy on whether racial classifications are the 
equivalent of racial discrimination.57 Reflecting an anti-classification understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause, Thomas considers racial classifications to be the 
same as racial discrimination. From this perspective, the “alleged educational 
benefits of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination today.”58 By equating 
racial classifications with racial discrimination, he renders any research related 
to the educational benefits of diversity as irrelevant to the legal determinations 
in the case. As he states, “just as the alleged educational benefits of segregation 
were insufficient to justify racial discrimination then [citing Brown], the alleged 
educational benefits of diversity cannot justify racial discrimination today.”59 
1. Contextual Support for Anti-Classification Understanding of the Equal Protection Clause
 Throughout the opinion, Thomas advances several conclusions about the university’s 
policy that render it unconstitutional under his reading of the Equal Protection Clause 
as prohibiting all types of racial classifications. A substantial part of his opinion, 
for instance, cites text presented in legal briefs submitted by the main parties in the 
cases that accompanied the Brown case. He cites the text of these briefs to equate the 
rationale for race-conscious policies in Fisher to those that were advanced in support 
of segregated schools during the litigation in Brown. In making these arguments, he 
uses non-legal sources as contextual support for his argument. In addressing one of 
the arguments made against the desegregation of schools (i.e., that public schools 
would decline in quality or cease to exist altogether), he cites to a book that documented 
such consequences: “[a]fter being ordered to desegregate, Prince Edward County 
closed its public schools from the summer of 1959 until the fall of 1964.”60 
53  Including an article published in the University California Law Review (see infra for text 
accompanying note 69). 
54 These include articles published in the Journal of Negro Education and Research in Higher 
Education (see infra notes 64, 75). 
55 Including reports published by the National Science Foundation and American Association 
of Medical Colleges (see infra note 76). 
56 Such as a CNN report (Monika Plocienniczak, Pennsylvania School Experiments with ‘Segregation,’ 
CNN (Jan. 27, 2011) http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/01/27/pennsylvania.segregation/index.html.) 
57 This disagreement is based on an understanding of the Equal Protection Clause from an 
anti-classification versus anti-subordination perspective. See, e.g., John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, 
Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition 
of Discrimination, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 436–38 (2002). 
58 Fisher I, at 2424–25.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 2426 (citing R. Sarratt, The Ordeal of Desegregation 237 (1966)).
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 Thomas also uses non-legal sources to demonstrate that the university’s policy 
is a “pretext” for discrimination—discrimination that even if presented as “benign” 
is nevertheless racial discrimination. In a lengthy paragraph, for example, Thomas 
cites various books that quoted speeches of slaveholders who “argued that slavery 
was a ‘positive good’ that civilized blacks and elevated them in every dimension 
of life.”61 In one of the citations to a legal brief in Briggs,62 which argued that 
“separate schools protected black children racist white students and teachers,”63 
he explicitly includes a parenthetical to note that the brief was quoting an article 
by DuBois.64 Because both involve racial discrimination, Thomas argues that there 
is no principled distinction between the University’s assertion that diversity yields 
educational benefits and the segregationists’ arguments that segregation also 
yielded those same benefits.65 
2. Legal Determinations on Harms to Students
In addition, Thomas argues that the university’s race-conscious policy has 
insidious consequences for those who are admitted under the policy. In advancing 
this line of argument, he ignores the relevance of research on the benefits of diversity, 
while simultaneously relying on non-legal sources that argue the opposite, 
including those in support of the “mismatch” theory.66 On this point, he cites to 
several sources, including the Amicus Curiae Brief for Richard Sander et al.67 and a 
book by Thomas Sowell that advances the mismatch theory.68 In a statement that 
61 Id., at 2429 (citing text from various books).
62 34 U.S. 350 (1952).
63 Fisher I, at 2430.
64 W.E.B DuBois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. Negro Educ. 328, 330-31 (1935).
65 In a footnote, Thomas acknowledges the difference that “the segregationists argued that it 
was segregation that was necessary to obtain the alleged benefits, whereas the University argues that 
diversity is the key” (Fisher I, at 2428, n.3). He also notes that “Today, the segregationists’ arguments 
would never be given serious consideration,” while citing to a news media report by CNN (supra 
note 56) as a “but see,” to illustrate that similar efforts are taking place today.
66 Conceptually, mismatch suggests that admitted students with test scores below those of 
their peers at an institution do not perform as well and would therefore be better served by attending 
institutions where the average standardized test scores are similar to their own.
67 Specifically, Thomas states that “Blacks and Hispanics admitted to the University as a result 
of racial discrimination are, on average, far less prepared than their white and Asian classmates. In 
the University’s entering class of 2009, for example, among the students admitted outside the Top 
Ten Percent plan, blacks scored at the 52d percentile of 2009 SAT takers nationwide, while Asians 
scored at the 93d percentile [citing brief for Richard Sander et al. as amici curiae]” (Fisher I, at 2431). 
68 Thomas cites Thomas Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World, 145-46 (2004) in support 
of the argument that “the University’s discrimination has a pervasive shifting effect” of admitting 
“minorities who otherwise would have attended less selective colleges where they would have been 
more evenly matched” (Fisher I, at 2431). A number of amicus briefs filed in support of the university 
challenged the theory of mismatch as well as the findings from work that claims to support it. See., 
e.g., Brief of Empirical Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of 
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), passim (citing multiple studies and articles rebutting 
methodology and research design of Sander and Taylor’s studies, including statistical errors and 
regression analysis that could not produce credible estimates of causation, as well as rebutting claims 
that their work is unchallenged and presenting findings directly contradictory to theirs in terms 
of educational outcomes for minority students); Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological 
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appears to dismiss the large body of research disputing the mismatch argument 
and findings, he notes: 
Tellingly, neither the University nor any of the 73 amici briefs in support of 
racial discrimination has presented a shred of evidence that black and Hispanic 
students are able to close this substantial gap during their time at the University. 
Cf. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, Reflections on the Shape of the River, 46 UCLA 
L. Rev. 1583, 1605–1608 (1999) (discussing the failure of defenders of racial 
discrimination in admissions to consider the fact that its “beneficiaries” are 
underperforming in the classroom).69 
Thomas goes on to directly quote from a book: “‘It is a fact that in virtually all 
selective schools … where racial preferences in admission is practiced, the majority 
of [black] students end up in the lower quarter of their class.’”70 He speculates 
that “[t]here is no reason to believe this is not the case at the University”71 and 
accuses “The University and its dozens of amici” as being “deafeningly silent on 
this point”72 Emphasizing the harms for students admitted under race-conscious 
policies, he states: “Setting aside the damage wreaked upon the self-confidence 
of these overmatched students, there is no evidence that they learn more at 
the University than they would have learned at other schools for which they 
were better prepared. Indeed, they may learn less.”73 With these statements, he 
categorially dismisses the large body of work demonstrating contrary findings.74
Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(No. 11-345), at *29–31 (citing research purporting mismatch hypothesis is empirically flawed and 
ignores other influences on student performance and persistence); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National 
Education Association, et al., in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. 
Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *32–34 (citing criticisms of Sander’s flawed methodology and inability 
of studies using the same data and other analytical approaches to replicate Sander’s findings); Brief 
of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *26–31 (citing to multiple 
analyses questioning empirical foundations and methodological soundness of studies purporting 
mismatch). See also Brief Amicus Curiae for Richard Lempert in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. 
University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), passim (citing to multiple analyses that 
criticize methods employed by Sander and that question results of his findings, their replicability, 
and problematic assumptions regarding ordering of tiers of schools, and utilizing quantity of studies 
at odds with Sander’s work to show how Sander has attempted to create false consensus around 
mismatch theory by ignoring critics and contradictory findings). Thomas, however, dismisses 
the relevance of the social science studies cited in these briefs, which dispute in great detail the 
methodology and interpretation of the findings of the sources he cites. 
69 Fisher I, at 2431.
70 Id. (citing “S. Cole & E. Barber, Increasing Faculty Diversity: The Occupational Choices of 
High–Achieving Minority Students 124 (2003)”).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae Kimberley West-Faulcon in Support of Respondents, Fisher 
v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *19–23 (citing to multiple 
studies showing higher graduation rates among minority students attending elite institutions 
where their admissions scores are below those of institution’s White average and lack of strong (or 
any) predictability of scores such as LSAT or SAT for academic performance of minority students); 
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 Thomas cites non-legal sources to support additional arguments related to the 
harms of the university’s policy, including “some evidence that students admitted 
as a result of racial discrimination are more likely to abandon their initial aspirations 
to become scientists and engineers than are students with similar qualifications 
who attend less selective schools.”75 He provides contextual support for his 
argument by citing reports by the National Science Foundation and the American 
Association of Medical Colleges that illustrate: “The success of historically black 
colleges at producing graduates who go on to earn graduate degrees in science 
and engineering.”76  
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion in Fisher I
 Similar to Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg cites amicus briefs and non-
legal sources as contextual support for her legal determinations and underlying 
understanding of what is permitted by the Equal Protection Clause. 
1. Contextual Support for Legal Determinations
 Ginsburg cites amicus briefs to support the statement that the university’s race-
conscious policy is “like so many educational institutions across the nation.”77 
Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher 
v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *29–31 (citing multiple studies 
finding that graduation rates for minority students increase with selectivity of institution); Brief Amici 
Curiae of 28 Undergraduate and Graduate Student Organizations Within the University of California 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 
at *25–26 (citing multiple studies documenting that graduation rates increase for under-represented 
minorities with selectivity of institution, including studies that selectivity increase benefited African 
American students more than White students and that selectivity was only statistically significant 
factor affecting African American graduation rates); Brief for the National Black Law Students 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *13–15, 24 (citing to multiple studies finding that Black students 
are more likely to graduate from selective institutions than less-selective institutions and that Black 
students in lowest category of SAT scores graduated at progressively higher levels as institutional 
selectivity increased); Brief of the American Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 
at *24–32 (citing to multiple studies finding that internal stigma among minority undergraduate 
students was significantly lower in minority students at schools with race-conscious admissions 
than at schools that bar race-conscious admissions and that minority students nationwide and at 
public Texas institutions had higher graduation rates at more selective institutions than at those less-
selective institutions where their admissions credentials would have made them a better “match”).
75 Fisher I, at 2431–32 (citing “Elliott, Strenta, Adair, Matier, & Scott, The Role of Ethnicity in 
Choosing and Leaving Science in Highly Selective Institutions, 37 Research in Higher Educ. 681, 
699–701 (1996)”).
76 Id. at 2432, n.5 (citing “National Science Foundation, J. Burrelli & A. Rapoport, InfoBrief, 
Role of HBCUs as Baccalaureate–Origin Institutions of Black S & E Doctorate Recipients 6 (2008) 
(Table 2)” and “American Association of Medical Colleges, Diversity in Medical Education: Facts & 
Figures 86 (2012) (Table 19)”).
77 Specifically, she references “Brief for Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae 33–35; Brief for 
Association of American Law Schools as Amicus Curiae 6; Brief for Association of American Medical 
Colleges et al. as Amici Curiae 30–32; Brief for Brown University et al. as Amici Curiae 2–3, 13; Brief for 
Robert Post et al. as Amici Curiae 24–27; Brief for Fordham University et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6; Brief 
for University of Delaware et al. as Amici Curiae 16–21” (Fisher I, at 2433, n.5).
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In demonstrating that other institutions follow the university’s approach, she 
suggests that any ruling by the Court that changes prior case law would affect many 
other institutions, a concern that Justice Breyer shared during the oral argument 
in Fisher I.78 In addition to providing this broader context for the impact of the 
Court’s ruling, Ginsburg cites to non-legal sources as contextual support for the 
determination that the Top Ten Percent Plan is not race-neutral, but race-conscious. 
In a memorable quote, she stated: “Only an ostrich could regard the supposedly 
neutral alternative as race unconscious.”79 She writes: “It is race consciousness, not 
blindness to race, that drives such plans,” and in an accompanying footnote cites 
to a book that included a law professor’s famous statement: “‘If you think that you 
can think about a thing inextricably attached to something else without thinking of 
the thing which it is attached to, then you have a legal mind.’”80 
2. Understanding of Ongoing Significance of Race Reflecting Findings of Social Science Research
 Importantly, in her opinion, Ginsburg references her understanding of the 
ongoing significance of race, an understanding that reflects findings of research 
studies cited in amicus briefs submitted in support of the university. Quoting 
her dissent in Gratz, in Fisher I she states: “I have several times explained why 
government actors, including state universities, need not be blind to the lingering 
effects of ‘an overtly discriminatory past,’ the legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned 
inequality.’”81 Numerous amicus briefs submitted in support of the university 
summarized research findings documenting the lingering effects of government-
sanctioned racial segregation and other ways in which race continues to influence 
educational outcomes and opportunity.82  For these reasons, Ginsburg “remain[s] 
78 In addressing the lawyer for Abigail Fisher, Justice Breyer asks, “Why overrule a case into 
which so much thought and effort went and so many people across the country have depended on” 
(Transcript of Oral Argument at *8, lines 12-14, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (No. 11-345)).
79 Fisher I, at 2433.
80 Id. (citing “T. Arnold, The Symbols of Government 101 (1935)”).
81 Id. at 2433. See also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 300–01 (noting that “[b]ias both conscious and 
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must 
come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s 
law and practice”).
82 See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in Support 
of Respondent, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *6–11 
(summarizing research findings demonstrating ongoing racial disparities in education, employment, 
criminal justice, healthcare, and other sectors in society); Brief of Social and Organizational 
Psychologists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *27–29 (citing to studies finding continued negative impact of 
economic segregation on educational opportunities and outcomes of minority students); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Coalition of Bar Associations of Color in Support of Respondent, Fisher v. University 
of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *16–20 (citing research documenting history 
of exclusion and segregation and its connection to present day racial inequities in education); Brief 
of National Latino Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of 
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), at *31–34 (citing research demonstrating connection 
between former de jure and present de facto school racial segregation); Brief of Amicus Curiae the 
American Psychological Association in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at 
Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), at *10–18 (citing numerous research findings documenting 
detrimental effects of sub-conscious racial bias on educational outcomes by race).
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convinced [that policies] that candidly disclose their consideration of race [are] 
preferable to those that conceal it.”83 As she stated in Gratz, the recognition of 
race in policies is important because it can help counter the negative effects of 
subconscious racialized judgments.84 Ginsburg’s view reflects a reading of the 
Equal Protection Clause that allows for state actors to address the continuing 
importance of race. As she states: “the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits 
government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance of race.”85 
D. Justice Alito’s Dissenting Opinion in Fisher II86
Like Justice Thomas’s dissent, Justice Alito’s dissent in Fisher II cites to a range of 
non-legal sources and amicus curiae briefs87 that include: evidence from the record, 
demographics statistics,88 education journals,89 books,90 policy reports,91 news 
sources,92 and college reports/admissions standards/guidelines. Like Kennedy, 
Alito cites evidence from the record, and from non-legal sources, to support 
factual and legal conclusions as well as contextual support for critique of the 
university’s goals. Unlike Kennedy, he finds the factual record insufficient to meet 
the elements of narrow tailoring. Specifically, his arguments negate the relevance 
of the evidence in the record by outlining parameters of evidence that are missing. 
At the same time, he relies on findings from non-legal sources, including research, 
that support his criticism of the university’s race-conscious policy. His criticism 
is based on a fundamental understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as one 
that calls for “race-neutrality,” reflecting an anti-classification reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause, and a definition of race that is limited to skin color. 
1. Factual Conclusions
 In Part I of the opinion, Alito cites to non-legal sources to support a number 
of factual conclusions. For example, he cites to evidence in the factual record to 
support his conclusion that UT had achieved a high (and presumably sufficient) 
83 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433–34 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 305 n.11 (2003)).  
84 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 299–301, 304–05 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. at 305 n.11. 
86 Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.
87 These include amicus curiae briefs submitted by the following organizations and/or 
individuals: the Cato Institute, Judicial Education Project, California Institute of Technology, 
Amherst, Experimental Psychologists, Asian American Legal Foundation et al., Judicial Watch, and 
Six Educational Nonprofit Orgs.
88 Including demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Department of Education, 
and UT’s office of admissions (see infra notes 108, 118, 124, and 126).
89 Such as articles published in the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education and Harvard 
Educational Review (see infra notes 127 and 128).
90 Including SAT Wars by Soares (see infra note 128).
91 Those published by the Pew Research Center and the University of Texas system (otherwise 
referred to as the “Kroll Report”) (see infra notes 110 and 119). 
92 These include articles published in the Dallas Morning News, Wall Street Journal, 
Washington Post, and National Law Journal (see infra notes 95, 111, 126, 127).
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level of racial diversity under the TTP. He states: “By 2004—the last year under 
the holistic, race-neutral AI/PAI system—UT’s entering class was 4.5% African-
American, 17.9% Asian-American, and 16.9% Hispanic. Supp. App. 156a. The 
2004 entering class thus had a higher percentage of African-Americans, Asian-
Americans, and Hispanics than the class that entered in 1996, when UT had last 
employed racial preferences.”93 Next, Alito cites to the record to support factual 
conclusions related to the steps UT undertook before introducing the consideration 
of race after Grutter implicitly overruled Hopwood. Alito cites to a string of news 
media reports, for example, to support the conclusion that for the university, 
the “reintroduction of race into the admissions process was anything other than 
a foregone conclusion” the very day Grutter was handed down. Based on these 
news media accounts, Alito dismisses the Proposal and the accompanying studies 
that the university undertook the year after Grutter, going as far as saying “there 
is no evidence”94 to support the contention that the university engaged in such 
deliberations.  
 In addition, Alito cites to the record to support the view that race is an 
“omnipresent” factor in the university’s policies, and in doing so relies on the same 
evidence Kennedy relied on, but to reach the opposite conclusion. Alito states: 
Because an applicant’s race is identified at the front of the admissions file, 
reviewers are aware of it throughout the evaluation.” 645 F.Supp.2d, at 597; 
see also id., at 598 (“[A] candidate’s race is known throughout the application 
process”). Consideration of race therefore pervades every aspect of UT’s 
admissions process. See App. 219a (“We are certainly aware of the applicant’s 
race. It’s on the front page of the application that’s being read [and] is used in 
context with everything else that’s part of the applicant’s file”).95
For these reasons, he rejects the university’s argument that “race is a factor of a 
factor” or a “contextual” determination. 
 While relying on evidence from the record to support a conclusion about “the 
omnipresence of racial classifications”96 in the university’s policy, Alito also faults 
it for failing to “keep any statistics on how many students are affected by the 
consideration of race in admissions decisions [or] “how many minority students 
are affected in a positive manner by the consideration of race.”97 He concludes 
that “UT thus makes no effort to assess how the individual characteristics of 
students admitted as the result of racial preferences differ (or do not differ) from 
those of students who would have been admitted without them.”98 Because 
93 Fisher II, at 2218.
94 Id. at 2219.
95 Id. at 2220 (further citing to an editorial by former UT President Bill Powers published in the 
National Law Journal, “Powers, Why Schools Still Need Affirmative Action, National L. J., Aug. 4, 
2014, p. 22”, for the proposition that “UT considers its use of racial classifications to be a benign form 
of ‘social engineering’”).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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Alito’s argument relies primarily on “racial classifications” that are devoid of 
other contextual factors, in his mind, the consideration of race can be isolated for 
having determined a student’s “odds of admission.”99 And because race is a factor 
that can be isolated, Alito faults the university for not presenting evidence that 
demonstrates its consideration for “each” applicant—evidence that he would also 
find relevant for the elements of narrow tailoring.100 In this way, Alito’s use of 
non-legal sources reflects a fundamental disagreement with Kennedy’s majority 
opinion about the definition (or manifestations) of race and the role it plays in the 
university’s determinations. 
2. Legal Determinations 
1. Necessity of Race-Conscious Means 
 Overall, Alito dismisses the relevance of the non-legal sources Kennedy cites 
to support legal determinations in the case. He dismisses it on the grounds that 
it fails to demonstrate what is needed to show that race is necessary to further 
the university’s compelling interest. In reference to the survey study of students’ 
experiences, Alito faults the university for failing to demonstrate that “its race-
conscious plan actually ameliorates this situation.”101 He faults the university for 
presenting “no evidence that its admissions officers, in administering the ‘holistic’ 
component of its plan, make any effort to determine whether an African-American, 
Hispanic, or Asian-American student is likely to enroll in classes in which minority 
students are underrepresented”102 He notes: 
although UT’s records should permit it to determine without much difficulty 
whether holistic admittees are any more likely than students admitted through 
the Top Ten Percent Law [citation omitted] to enroll in the classes lacking 
racial or ethnic diversity, UT either has not crunched those numbers or has not 
revealed what they show.103 
Alito also finds evidence from the Proposal insufficient: “The Proposal did 
not analyze the backgrounds, life experiences, leadership qualities, awards, 
extracurricular activities, community service, personal attributes, or other 
characteristics of the minority students who were already being admitted to UT 
under the holistic, race-neutral process.”104 Alito thus focuses on data that is missing 
in a manner that ultimately dismisses the data that was sufficient for Kennedy’s 
factual and legal conclusions.   
99 Id.
100 It is worth noting that this approach presents a catch-22 for the university. If the university 
could provide such evidence, then it would open itself to legal vulnerability for a process that makes 
race a determinative factor and not holistic. Yet, by not being able to provide the evidence, they fail 
to satisfy the standard Alito requires for strict scrutiny.  
101 Id. at 2216.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2219.
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 Alito also faults the university for failing to demonstrate that its race-conscious 
admissions helped address the concern over the number of students of color in 
smaller undergraduate classes. He states: 
As far as the record shows, UT failed to even scratch the surface of the available 
data before reflexively resorting to racial preferences. For instance, because UT 
knows which students were admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan and 
which were not, as well as which students enrolled in which classes, it would 
seem relatively easy to determine whether Top Ten Percent students were more 
or less likely than holistic admittees to enroll in the types of classes where 
diversity was lacking. But UT never bothered to figure this out. See ante, at 
2209 (acknowledging that UT submitted no evidence regarding “how students 
admitted solely based on their class rank differ in their contribution to diversity 
from students admitted through holistic review”). Nor is there any indication 
that UT instructed admissions officers to search for African-American and 
Hispanic applicants who would fill particular gaps at the classroom level.105 
Without this evidence, according to Alito, the university cannot demonstrate 
that the consideration of race is needed. 
2. Precision of the University’s Goal and Critical Mass 
 Alito cites non-legal sources to support the conclusion that university’s 
interests are not “concrete or precise.”106 In response to Kennedy’s references to 
the university’s Proposal as evidence of the specified goals the university sought 
to meet, Alito dismisses the relevance of such evidence on the grounds that: “If 
a university can justify racial discrimination simply by having a few employees 
opine that racial preferences are necessary to accomplish these nebulous goals, see 
ante, at 2210–2211 (citing only self-serving statements from UT officials), then the 
narrow tailoring inquiry is meaningless.”107 By referring to the statements as “self-
serving,” Alito questions the reliability of such sources. The extent to which the 
evidence from the factual record was relevant for informing a legal determination, 
therefore, seemed to depend on whether it supports the university’s case (in which 
case it is suspect and not relevant), or whether it refutes it (in which case it is not 
suspect, but relevant). This ideological position as a metric for considering the 
relevance of research is also one that Justice Thomas appears to adopt, a metric 
that does not bode well for researchers or colleges and universities that seek to use 
research to inform their deliberations.
 In addition to whether the evidence can be considered “self-serving” or not, 
Alito would require the university to present evidence that supports the necessity 
of a race-conscious policy before the policy is put into place. The evidence the 
university considered, before reintroducing race into its policy, however, was not 
sufficient for Alito. Instead, what Alito requires, in part, are statistics about how 
many students are affected by the consideration of race and which students are 
105 Id. at 2226–27.
106 Id. at 2223. 
107 Id.
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admitted as a result of a race-conscious system or under a race-neutral process. His 
rationale also appears to require evidence that demonstrates the lack of educational 
benefits of diversity when race-conscious policies are not in place (that is, under 
a race-neutral process), a standard that would position many diversity-related 
studies, which focus on capturing the educational outcomes from diverse peers 
and environments, incomplete in their findings and potentially irrelevant. 
 Alito also cites non-legal sources, particularly demographic characteristics, to 
support the argument that the university’s goals, including obtaining a critical mass, 
are akin to racial balancing. Citing facts published by the U.S. Census, Alito asks: 
Does critical mass depend on the relative size of a particular group in the 
population of a State? For example, is the critical mass of African-Americans and 
Hispanics in Texas, where African-Americans are about 11.8% of the population 
and Hispanics are about 37.6%, different from the critical mass in neighboring 
New Mexico, where the African-American population is much smaller (about 
2.1%) and the Hispanic population constitutes a higher percentage of the State’s 
total (about 46.3%)?108 
Referencing the Proposal’s “numerical assessments of the racial makeup of the 
student body,” Alito faults the university for “resort[ing] to a simple racial census,” 
“instead of focusing on the benefits of diversity.”109 In doing so, Alito dismisses 
the relevance of the findings from the students’ survey and their educational 
experiences. 
3. Good Faith Determination of Race-Neutral Alternatives
 Expanding on a point raised in Part I of his opinion, Alito draws from what 
Kennedy refers to as “extra record” evidence to question the university’s motives 
in its admissions policies and its “good faith” determination of alternatives to 
race-conscious admissions. Alito cites a report published by the UT system that 
conducted an investigation of the university’s policies to support the conclusion 
that “UT maintained a clandestine admissions system that evaded public scrutiny 
until a former admissions officer blew the whistle in 2014.”110 In addition, he cites 
the report and a news article to support the conclusion that: 
Under this longstanding, secret process, university officials regularly overrode 
normal holistic review to allow politically connected individuals—such as 
donors, alumni, legislators, members of the Board of Regents, and UT officials 
and faculty—to get family members and other friends admitted to UT, despite 
having grades and standardized test scores substantially below the median for 
admitted students.111 
108 Id. at 2224 (citing “United States Census Bureau, QuickFacts, online at https://www.census.
gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/35,48 (all Internet materials as last visited June 21, 2016)”).
109 Id. at 2225.
110 Id. at 2240 (citing “Kroll, Inc., University of Texas at Austin—Investigation of Admissions 
Practices and Allegations of Undue Influence 4 (Feb. 6, 2015) (Kroll Report)”).
111 Id. Citing pp. 12–14 of the Kroll Report and “Blanchard & Hoppe, Influential Texans Helped 
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In his majority opinion, Kennedy explicitly rejects the relevance of the report 
and the news media accounts on the grounds that they are “extra record” materials 
(i.e., not submitted during the time of the litigation in the lower courts), tangential 
to the case, and because the university did not have “a full opportunity to 
respond” to them.112 In a lengthy footnote citing to the brief for the respondent and 
several amicus briefs, Alito disputes all of these points, highlighting the instances 
in which the university responded to the allegations in the report, the relevance 
of the findings to a “good faith” determination, and its “hollow” concern about 
considering “extra record” materials when it, too, affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion, which according to Alito, “relied heavily” on its “own extrarecord internet 
research.”113
4. Discrimination Against Asian Americans
 Alito dedicates a substantial part of his opinion to addressing the role Asian 
American students play in the university’s admissions policy. Specifically, Alito 
finds the university’s policy to “discriminate against Asian-American students”114 
and cites to text from an amicus brief filed in support of the Petitioner to note that: 
“In UT’s view, apparently, ‘Asian Americans are not worth as much as Hispanics in 
promoting “cross-racial understanding,” breaking down “racial stereotypes,” and 
enabling students to ‘better understand persons of different races.’”115 To bolster 
this point and demonstrate that the university’s policy discriminates against Asian 
Americans, Alito cites to various amicus briefs to provide a historical context of 
discrimination against Asian Americans. He states: “the Court’s willingness to 
allow this ‘discrimination against individuals of Asian descent in UT admissions is 
particularly troubling, in light of the long history of discrimination against Asian 
Americans, especially in education.’”116 Kennedy’s and Alito’s citation to the amicus 
briefs that support their respective conclusions illustrates the role these briefs can 
play in providing contextual or rhetorical support for the legal determinations in 
the case, a focus that has implications for future cases. 
5. Definition of Racial Categories and Race
 Alito also cites to amicus briefs and non-legal sources to criticize the university’s 
“crude” racial categories and the definition (or lack thereof) of various racial and 
Underqualified Students Get Into UT, Dallas Morning News, July 20, 2015, online at http://www.
dallasnews.com/news/education/headlines/20150720-influential-texans-helped-underqualified-
students-get-into-ut.ece (“Dozens of highly influential Texans—including lawmakers, millionaire 
donors and university regents—helped underqualified students get into the University of Texas, 
often by writing to UT officials, records show”).”
112 Id. at 2211–12.
113 Id. at 2240, n.18.
114 Id. at 2227.
115 Id. (citing “Brief for Asian American Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 11 (representing 117 
Asian-American organizations”).
116 Id. at 2228 (citing Brief for Asian American Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae).
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ethnic groups.117 Using the example of Asian Americans, he cites two different 
amicus briefs submitted in support of the petitioner to demonstrate the varied 
backgrounds that are captured by such a broad category, including “individuals 
of Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Hmong, Indian and other 
backgrounds comprising roughly 60% of the world’s population.”118 He also cites 
to demographic data published by the U.S. Census Bureau and a report by the Pew 
Research Center to support the statement that an increasing number of individuals 
describe “themselves as multiple races” and “marry a spouse of a different race 
or ethnicity.”119 Based on these sources, Alito concludes that the U.S. is “rapidly 
becoming” a “more integrated country.”120 He seems to define “integration” based 
on the percentage of individuals who report interracial marriage, a conception of 
race that is based on biology and/or color of one’s skin.
 Alito also questions whether a student’s race is connected to a varied 
perspective in the classroom, a view that categorically dismisses findings from 
social science research demonstrating the connection in light of the history of the 
U.S. For instance, he asks: “If an applicant has one grandparent, great-grandparent, 
or great-great-grandparent who was a member of a favored group, is that enough 
to permit UT to infer that this student’s classroom contribution will reflect a 
distinctive perspective or set of experiences associated with that group? UT does 
not say.”121 In doing so, Alito not only disagrees with precedent in Grutter (where 
the majority opinion authored by Justice O’Connor acknowledged the connection 
between race and experiences that contribute a different perspective), but ignores 
findings from a large body of research studies demonstrating the relationship 
between race and backgrounds and experiences. Amicus briefs submitted in support 
of the university summarized the research that supported these arguments.122 It is 
117 This question of racial categories was one that a four-Justice block, including Alito, in a 
concurring opinion in Parents Involved rendered the school districts’ voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment policies unconstitutional (551 U.S. at 2743–44. Kennedy, J. joined with respect to Parts I, 
II, III & III.C) (noting that the district’s plan was too “broad,” and “imprecise” in utilizing categories 
of only “white” and “non-white,” and did not state a clear necessity for use of racial classifications).
118 Id. at 2229 & n.6 (citing Brief for Asian American Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Fisher 
I and Brief for Judicial Watch in Fisher II).
119 Id. at 2230, n.7 (citing “United States Census Bureau, 2010 Census Shows Multiple–Race 
Population Grew Faster Than Single–Race Population (Sept. 27, 2012), online at https://www.
census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/race/cb12-182.html”) and n.8 (citing “W. Wang, Pew 
Research Center, Interracial Marriage: Who Is “Marrying Out”? (June 12, 2015), online at http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/12/interracial-marriage-who-is-marrying-out/; W. 
Wang, Pew Research Center, The Rise of Intermarriage (Feb. 16, 2012), online at http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/”).
120 Id. at 2230.
121 Id.
122 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and 
the Southern Poverty Law Center, et al., in Support of Respondents in, Fisher v. University of Tex. 
at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), at *21 (citing numerous studies finding that students’ 
race and/or ethnicity plays a role in shaping their perspectives and worldviews); Brief of Teach for 
America et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981), at *19 (citing multiple studies supporting conclusion that schools should 
include information about applicants’ racial and ethnic identities in addition to socioeconomic status 
to truly capture existing viewpoints and experiences); Brief of Amici Curiae for the American Jewish 
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not surprising that Alito ignores the relevance of this research, as his rationale 
illustrates a definition of race that is a-contextual and a-historical.
3. Contextual Support to Question the Candid Nature of the University’s Interest 
Alito relies on research findings to support the argument that the university’s 
race-conscious policy is based on “unsupported assumptions” about African-
American and Hispanic students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan. He 
cites to non-legal sources to support the argument that the university’s interest 
in “diversity within diversity” reflects an interest in seeking the “right type” of 
student, that is, one that is wealthy or has high standardized test scores. Across a 
long section of his opinion, for example, Alito cites statistics from the Department 
of Education, the U.S. Census Bureau, the university’s office of admission, and the 
record, to support the conclusions that African-American and Hispanic students 
admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan: (a) have the education levels that far 
exceed the norm in Texas,123 (b) have income levels that exceed the Texas median,124 
and (c) earned a higher mean grade point average than those admitted outside of 
the Top Ten Percent Law.125 
On this last point, Alito cites to a news media article from the Washington Post 
documenting findings from “nationwide studies” “showing that high school 
Committee, Union for Reform Judaism, Central Conference of American Rabbis, and Women of 
Reform Judaism in Support of Respondents, Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 
(2016) (No. 14-981), at *16 (citing various studies finding experience of racial discrimination, race 
consciousness, and different “culturally related experiences” of members of different racial and 
ethnic groups will directly impact perspectives).
123 For example, on pages 2232–33, Alito writes: “In 2008, when petitioner applied to UT, 
approximately 79% of Texans aged 25 years or older had a high school diploma, 17% had a bachelor’s 
degree, and 8% had a graduate or professional degree. Dept. of Educ., Nat. Center for Educ. Statistics, 
T. Snyder & S. Dillow, Digest of Education Statistics 2010, p. 29 (2011). In contrast, 96% of African-
Americans admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan had a parent with a high school diploma, 59% 
had a parent with a bachelor’s degree, and 26% had a parent with a graduate or professional degree. 
See UT, Office of Admissions, Student Profile, Admitted Freshman Class of 2008, p. 8 (rev. Aug. 1, 
2012) [citation omitted]. Similarly, 83% of Hispanics admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan had a 
parent with a high school diploma, 42% had a parent with a bachelor’s degree, and 21% had a parent 
with a graduate or professional degree. Ibid. As these statistics make plain, the minorities that UT 
characterizes as “coming from depressed socioeconomic backgrounds,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 53 (Dec. 9, 
2015), generally come from households with education levels exceeding the norm in Texas.”
124 Specifically, on page 2233, Alito notes: “In 2008, the median annual household income 
in Texas was $49,453. United States Census Bureau, A. Noss, Household Income for States: 2008 
and 2009, p. 4 (2010), online at https://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acsbr09-2.pdf. The 
household income levels for Top Ten Percent African-American and Hispanic admittees were on par: 
Roughly half of such admittees came from households below the Texas median, and half came from 
households above the median. See 2008 Student Profile 6. And a large portion of these admittees are 
from households with income levels far exceeding the Texas median. Specifically, 25% of African-
Americans and 27% of Hispanics admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan in 2008 were raised in 
households with incomes exceeding $80,000. Ibid.”
125 Citing the record, Alito states on p. 2234: “Indeed, the statistics in the record reveal that, for 
each year between 2003 and 2007, African-American in-state freshmen who were admitted under the 
Top Ten Percent Law earned a higher mean grade point average than those admitted outside of the 
Top Ten Percent Law. Supp. App. 164a. The same is true for Hispanic students. Id., at 165a.”
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grades are a better predictor of success in college than SAT scores.”126 and to two 
education journal articles (both published in the Harvard Educational Review), 
three separate amicus briefs filed in support of the respondent, and another media 
report, for the proposition that the SAT “has often been accused of reflecting racial 
and cultural bias” and “clearly correlate[s] with wealth.”127 As further contextual 
support for this argument, Alito cites to an education journal article, a book, and 
numerous examples of institutions that do not require the SAT or ACT.128 
 On a separate point, Alito cites to figures from the U.S. Census bureau to 
question the logic of the university’s interest in seeking demographic parity 
to avoid isolation. He states: “linking racial loneliness and isolation to state 
demographics is illogical. Imagine, for example, that an African-American student 
attends a university that is 20% African-American. If racial isolation depends on a 
comparison to state demographics, then that student is more likely to feel isolated 
if the school is located in Mississippi (which is 37.0% African-American) than if it is 
located in Montana (which is 0.4% African-American) [citing U.S. Census Bureau]. 
In reality, however, the student may feel—if anything—less isolated in Mississippi, 
where African-Americans are more prevalent in the population at large.”129
V. Implications for Postsecondary Institutions, Researchers, and Amici
 Our analysis indicates that the Justices utilized non-legal sources and amicus 
briefs in a variety of ways and toward vastly different ends in their opinions. 
One important overarching consideration is that the ideological differences of the 
Justices are part and parcel of the review of the constitutional questions involved 
in the affirmative action debate. As we noted, our analysis reveals that across the 
various opinions, the way the Justices conceptualized: (1) the manifestation of race 
(i.e., as skin color alone or as socially constructed in a number of ways) and (2) 
classifications on the basis of race (i.e., as whether the classification itself involves 
racial discrimination or not) informed their use of non-legal sources and amicus 
briefs and the extent to which they were relevant to the various factual, legal, 
or contextual determinations. In this Part, we first consider the broad lessons of 
our analysis for colleges and universities that employ race-conscious admissions, 
including lessons for general counsels and administrators. Next, we discuss the 
implications for researchers who seek to contribute to the legal debate as well as 
126 Fisher II, at 2234, n.10 (citing “Strauss, Study: High School Grades Best Predictor of College 
Success—Not SAT/ACT Scores, Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2014, online at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2014/02/21/a-telling-study-about-act-sat-scores/”).
127 Id. at n.11 (citing “Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s Ethnic and Social–Class Bias: A Method 
for Reestimating SAT Scores, 73 Harv. Ed. Rev. 1 (2003)”, “Santelices & Wilson, Unfair Treatment? 
The Case of Freedle, the SAT, and the Standardization Approach to Differential Item Functioning, 
80 Harv. Ed. Rev. 106, 127 (2010)”) and n.12 (citing “Zumbrun, SAT Scores and Income Inequality: 
How Wealthier Kids Rank Higher, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 2014, online at http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/2014/10/07/sat-scores-and-income-inequality-how-wealthier-kids-rank-higher”).
128 Id. at n.13 (citing “Wake Forest Presents the Most Serious Threat So Far to the Future of the 
SAT, The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 60 (Summer 2008), p. 9” and “J. Soares, SAT 
Wars: The Case for Test–Optional College Admissions 3 (2012)”). 
129 Id. at 2236.
191
to inform policy as postsecondary institutions comply with the Court’s decision. 
Finally, we conclude with thoughts for individuals and organizations considering 
the submission of amicus briefs in future Supreme Court cases.
A. Implications for Colleges and Universities
Our analysis reinforces the legal boundaries and needed documentation, as 
well as collaborations with researchers, that exist for colleges and universities as 
they consider how to enact admissions procedures and, potentially, defend them 
in court. The university, for example, was challenged to consider the question of 
how much “diversity” was developed through the Top Ten Percent Plan versus 
holistic admissions, reminding universities of the need to explore and document 
the outcomes associated with “race-neutral” alternatives aimed at obtaining racial 
and ethnic diversity. The Justices’ citation to the factual record and the non-legal 
sources that were submitted as part of that record further demonstrates the need 
for colleges and universities to continue to document and gather evidence of the 
benefits of diversity, and to do so by engaging in important collaborations with 
researchers, within or outside the university. Specifically, via the sources they cited, 
the Justices in Fisher reinforced what was outlined in Grutter: that there is a need 
for institutions to carefully document the educational benefits of diversity derived 
from implemented admissions processes. The findings of this study further suggest 
the importance of introducing such evidence early in the litigation process.
Related, universities need to clearly document the steps they undertake to realize 
the benefits of diversity after admissions. As Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority 
opinion-“Increasing minority enrollment may be instrumental to [the] educational 
benefits [of diversity],” but so is “provid[ing] an educational setting that fosters 
cross-racial understanding…[and] enlightened discussion and learning.”130 In this 
way, the Court emphasized an “educational setting” that allows for the educational 
benefits of diversity to occur. Kennedy’s use of the factual record, particularly 
the student survey, in his decision, also pointed to the importance of considering 
student experience when justifying race-conscious admissions policies. In so doing, 
the Court’s decision (and cited non-legal sources from the factual record) focused 
on the experiences of students in a way that prior decisions on affirmative action 
had not—shifting from a numbers-focused diversity approach to one that also 
considers efforts to realize the educational benefits of diversity. This shift requires 
that institutions not only attain numerical representation of students of color, but 
that they more fully document whether they are obtaining the educational benefits 
of diversity with policies and practices that promote the type of racial climate and 
environment that facilitates such benefits.131 
Finally, the Justices’ statements on the Top Ten Percent Plan and how the plan might 
be characterized (race-neutral or race-conscious), have implications for colleges 
130 Id. at 2211.
131 See, e.g., Garces, supra note 34; Liliana M. Garces & Uma M. Jayakumar, Dynamic Diversity: 
Toward a Contextual Understanding of Critical Mass, 43 Educ. Researcher 115 (2014).
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and universities that may implement similar policies in the future.132 Justice 
Ginsburg cites to a non-legal source as a rhetorical tool to emphasize the mental 
gymnastics that are needed to term the Top Ten Percent Plan “race-neutral.” The 
constitutionality of the Top Ten Percent Plan and whether it can be considered 
“race-neutral,” of course, was not a legal issue before the Court, yet, Ginsburg’s 
characterization of the plan may help bolster challenges to such plans on the 
grounds that they are “race-conscious.”133 Subsequently, general counsels and 
administrators will need to consider the framing of alternatives they may employ. 
B. Implications for Researchers
 Moving forward, it will be important for researchers to work with their own 
universities to help in rigorous documentation of admissions procedures and outcomes, 
as well as race-neutral alternatives. In relying on the evidence from the record and 
finding it sufficient to meet the elements of narrow tailoring, for example, Justice 
Kennedy’s rationale draws attention to the importance of this evidence for justifying 
the university’s race-conscious policy in the future. Throughout the opinion in Fisher II, 
Kennedy references the importance of “regular evaluation of data and consideration 
of student experience” to ensure “that race plays no greater role than is necessary to 
meet [the university’s] compelling interest.”134 He calls attention to: “[t]he type of data 
collected, and the manner in which it is considered,” as having “significant bearing 
on how the University must shape its admissions policy to satisfy strict scrutiny in 
the years to come.”135 At the end of the opinion, Kennedy states: “The University must 
continue to use this data to scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess 
whether changing demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy; 
and to identify the effects, both positive and negative, of the affirmative-action measures 
it deems necessary.”136 This clear reference to non-legal sources, and the need for 
additional evidence, provides many opportunities for researchers to engage by 
conducting studies to further inform the debate.
 One important consideration for researchers will be communicating findings 
to broad audiences via various mediums. Social science will likely continue 
playing an illuminating role in critical matters to education, particularly as 
colleges and universities and advocates strive to ensure equality and opportunity 
for all students. Toward this end, the communication of findings of work to broad 
audiences, including the media, is critical. As our analysis revealed, Justices cited 
media reports that discussed the findings of a study instead of the study itself. Justice 
Alito, for example, cited to the Washington Post, which summarized findings from 
research studies on the SAT. This indicates that media sources may be serving as 
“proxies” for studies. This use heightens the importance of media sources for more 
effective communication of research to legal audiences. 
132 See infra Part IV.
133 See infra Part IV.
134 Fisher II, at 2210.
135 Id.
136 Id., at 2214–15.
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 As researchers continue to conduct studies that may inform the Court’s 
deliberations on these constitutional questions, it is also important to understand, 
as our analysis revealed, that the Justice’s ideological positions may ultimately 
shape whether such research is deemed relevant or if it is cited in their opinions. 
As we noted, a number of amicus briefs in support of the university included 
findings from numerous studies that challenged the theory of mismatch as well as 
the findings from work that claims to support it. Justice Thomas, however, ignored 
the studies cited in these briefs, which dispute in great detail the methodology 
and interpretation of the findings of the sources he cites. As we demonstrate in 
our analysis, Thomas’ (and Alito’s) “anti-classification” reading of the Equal 
Protection Clause, which equates racial classifications with racial discrimination, 
shaped the consideration of the research and other non-legal sources. In 
contrast, Kennedy’s and Justice Ginsburg’s opinions reflect an understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause that allows for the consideration of race to address the 
ongoing significance of race and racial inequities. Kennedy’s majority opinion, 
moreover, reflects an understanding of race that is “contextual,” an understanding 
of race that is also supported by research findings. These perspectives underscore 
the importance of research that documents the myriad ways in which race continues 
to manifest in U.S. society and to shape students’ educational opportunities and 
life outcomes.  
C. Implications for Future Amici
While the utility of amicus briefs continues to be debated, it is clear in this case 
that the Justices do reference them in their opinions. In particular, Justice Kennedy’s, 
Justice Ginsburg’s, and Justice Alito’s citation to the amicus briefs that support 
their respective conclusions illustrates the role these briefs can play in providing 
contextual or rhetorical support for the legal determinations in the case. Through 
the explicit references to amicus briefs filed on either side of the case, Kennedy 
and Alito shared their perspectives on the relevance of research for addressing the 
argument that race-conscious policies discriminate against Asian Americans. This 
exchange has particular implications for future cases, including current lawsuits 
against the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill and Harvard University that 
are making their way through the courts and may ultimately reach the Supreme 
Court. With the case against Harvard involving an Asian American plaintiff, the 
exchange provides insight into how the various Justices viewed the relevance of 
amicus briefs that addressed this issue. 
Considering the findings from our analysis, individuals and organizations 
who believe they have a stake in the outcome of a case, or unique knowledge 
to contribute, might be encouraged to file briefs in future cases. Of course, not 
all briefs are cited; however, we note that some briefs, while not directly cited, 
are having an influence because their conclusions are reflected in the opinions of 
Justices. In sum, challenges to positions on either side of the issue allow amici to 
seek additional non-legal sources that might strengthen their arguments, as well 
as partner with researchers who may be able to assist in filling gaps in evidence. 
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V. Conclusion
 Ultimately, the Court in Fisher II upheld the constitutionality of race-conscious 
admissions. Throughout their opinions, the Justices cited non-legal sources and 
amicus briefs in conflicting ways, as informed by their respective positions on 
the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and their definitions of race. 
Understanding the Justice’s use (or questioning) of non-legal sources is critical 
for those interested in presenting this type of evidence to the Court. As challenges 
to affirmative action continue, the Justices’ use of non-legal sources and amicus 
briefs in Fisher suggests it is essential for colleges and universities to continue to 
document the need for their admissions policies, for researchers to communicate 
findings about this contentious issue to broad audiences via targeted mediums 
(particularly media sources) and for amici to continue to support their positions 
with various non-legal sources. Collaborations among institutions, researchers, 
and authors of amicus briefs may be specifically beneficial to derive and help 
translate the findings from research to legal audiences. These efforts will be 
important as social science continues to play an illuminating role in the decisions 
of the Supreme Court and, consequently, on educational policy.
